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The trade deficit, which together with the budget deficit 
constitutes one side of America's "twin deficits," is still an 
enormous sum. Since Japan accounts for one third of the trade 
deficit, one has to pay close attention to it in the sense that 
the deficit trend forecasts the future of U.S.-Japan economic 
friction. The trade deficit under the Reagan administration 
jumped with the strong dollar of the first half of the 1980s, 
which was seen as symbolizing a "strong America." Even though 
the strong dollar certainly was corrected after the 1985 Plaza 
Accord, the deficit grew even more swollen (Figure 1). 
The trade deficit's continuation became a headache for 
Washington's policy makers as well as something beyond the 
predictions of economists and academics. In general they saw 
this phenomenon as something running counter to "theory," or as 
nothing more than a sign that the dollar's fall had been 
insufficient. 
Such macroeconomic approaches as the bilateral comparison of 
the balance of savings and consumption provide a large framework 
for explaining America's trade deficit. However, paying 
attention to the kinds of changes which occurred in American 
industry in the period in which were adopted exceptional policies 
to stimulate a consumption which left behind huge budget deficits 
should provide one with a clue. Although these changes were in 
some sense irreversible, they were not noticed as such at the 
time. While showing a framework which takes into account 
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America's trade balance from that standpoint, let us view also 
the prospects for the optimism which has recently appeared. 
2. THE PARADOX OF THE DOLLAR'S FALL 
America's trade deficit became conspicuous in the latter 
half of the 1970s. Although there were such troubles as the 
"almighty dollar" at the time of the second oil shock, in general 
there were indications of the dollar's weakness. Under such 
conditions, although the trade deficit continued, its scope did 
not expand. Until the beginning of the 1980s it was around $3 0 
billion a year. However, the trade deficit exhibited a rapid 
expansion, especially after 1983. It continues even now to 
increase, although at a slackening tempo. 
Let us ascertain the deficit's expansion according to the 
preceeding information and Figure 1. This is an expression of 
1980's dollar rate, America's trade'balance, and corporate 
profits as well. Regarding the dollar rate, it is the effective 
exchange rate according to the representative Morgan Guaranty 
Bank. It is a weighted average rate based on the trade weight of 
15 advanced countries. With the 1980-82 average as 100 until 
1985's 127, the rate witnessed a rise of nearly 30 percent. The 
reasons for this rise are complex and are thought to be related 
to technical factors in foreign exchange markets. Whatever the 
reasons, it was an exceptional thing for the currency of a trade-
deficit nation. The dollar since the Plaza Accord continued to 
fall, 1987's average of 94 going so far as to fall under 1980's 
level. 
The dollar's rise of the mid-1980s has been wiped out, the 
dollar returning to its starting point. However, the movement of 
the trade balance differs from the expectations of multilateral 
policy makers and "pure" economic theory. The deficit which 
swelled to $13 0 billion in 1985 continued to increase even after 
the dollar's fall. Even though it took a favorable turn for the 
last two months of 1987, in the end the deficit climbed to a 
record $170 billion. 
Although the dollar returned to level existing at the start 
of the 198 0s, a defict 5 to 6 times its prior size at that time 
remains. Naturally, there may be objections to this 
understanding. "There is a trade deficit because the dollar's 
devaluation is insufficient." Such arguments are easy to put 
forth from the American side. Of course the deficit's 
Relationship to the currencies of the expanding NICs trade 
partners is also a problem. Consideration is being given to 
widening the weighted average to include the developing 
countries. There is also the possibility of substantiating and 
" * • • 
adjusting for the range of inflation between countries. On the 
Whole, there is no change in the deficit as a result of these 
Refinements in the way to recognize the "true" exchange rate. 
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It goes without saying here that the corporations 
responsible for economic activity are ultimately led by profits. 
One has to pay attention, then, to the considerable stability 
America's corporate profits have shown in contrast to the 
widening trade gap. It was in 1982 that the trade balance for 
industrial products went into deficit. The deficit has expanded 
since then, industrial products accounting for most of it. The 
manufacturing industry's corporate (pre-tax) profits, however, 
after falling in 1982, changed to recovery with the advent of 
improved business conditions since 1983. Profits in 1987 reached 
their previous peak at a level of approximately $90 billion. 
Naturally, corporate profits have in the end been flat for the 
1980s. At any rate, the situation is completely different from 
the destruction of manufacturing, as might be imagined from the 
trade deficit. 
,. 3. A WIDENING GAP OF IMPORTS OVER EXPORTS 
In concrete terms, how did the trade deficit expand? 
Looking at annual export and import figures by item from 1980 to 
i 1986, we see that the dollar value of export totals from $216.7 
?billion to $206.4 billion are almost flat. Consequently, one can 
say that the deficit's expansion resulted entirely from the 
increase in imports. Until 1983, the increase in imports 




In Table 1, it is evident by which product group the 
crease occurred. Remarkable are the machinery (electrical and 
g|eral) and transportation equipment categories whose sum of 
«oo billion since 1980 nearly amounted to the total import 
mire's rise. Most of it, then, arose after 1983. Once these 
America's representative export industries. The bottom line 
these groups, which in 1980 was still showing a fair surplus, 
worsened dramatically by 1986. The next largest import 
Increases were for the so-called purely consumer goods such as 
'urniture and fashion apparel. America not having been strong in 
ese exports, the import expansion was joined to this group's 
ade deficit. The increase in the import of primary processed 
ciustrial products was moderate. There was a decline in the 
port value of crude materials due to the fall in the price of 
rude oil. 
Import unit prices after 1983 for industrial products, 
xcluding petroleum, were almost stable on a dollar base. 
Increased import totals for industrial products, then, directly 
reflected that volume increase. The increase in import volume 
shows the deep influx of imports into the American economy. 
Table 2 shows how, corresponding to the rise in GDP, 
domestic production and imports increased. As stated before, 
since exports were almost stable, we can ignore their 
fluctuations. Therefore, one can think of GDP in terms of 
economic activity. Also, we will adopt industrial production 




imports. Here we see domestic production and imports both on a 
ity basis in relation to economic activity. According to 
.e 2, the production level in 1986 was approximately 20 
percent greater than in 1982. In total it increased at the same 
tempo as the expansion in demand. 
However, within the manufacturing industry, the rise in 
production lagged considerably behind the average, 
for the three sectors in question due to their 
importance in exports and imports: electrical machinery, general 
and transportation equipment. The rise is 
great in clay/glass/stone and furniture/fixtures, 
they push up the total level, these industries are of 
jecondary importance in trade. 
The rise in imports also, as reflected in their GDP 
:icity, was far greater than production. The 1986 level 
that in 1982 by 70 percent. It grew by almost 90 
percent for manufactured imports. Viewed by group by item 
^according to their final use, there is a great increase for 
capital goods (except automobiles), automobiles/parts/engines, 
.and consumer goods (except food). These correspond roughly in 
Table l respectively to "machinery," "transportation," and 
'consumer goods." As mentioned before, the rise in these import 








The next question is why such a rapid increase occurred in 
such key industrial products and consumer goods. It cannot be 
considered apart from the exceptional character of the improved 
"business conditions occurring under the Reagan administration 
;from 1983 thereafter. 
Under the Reagan administration, the large-scale tax cuts 
made in 1981-82 increased consumer spending. This increase in 
spending is sometimes mistaken for a strengthening of consumers * 
buying power. The illusion of increased buying power created 
^during the early euphoria of Reaganomics led to greatly increased 
% consumer borrowing and depleted savings rates. Imports increased 
las a result of a consumer binge which domestic production could 
.not satisfy. This in turn worsened the trade deficit. However, 
:this deficit was covered by the foreign capital drawn in due to 
the strong dollar. A peculiar economic environment emerged as a 
result. 
4. THE DEMAND-SIDE ECONOMY 
In the midst of this, automobiles alone came to be the 
greatest product for Japan's exports and America's imports. 
"Voluntary restraints" were implemented on the rapidly growing 
exports of chiefly small Japanese automobiles to the United 
States. Automobiles, which account for most of the transport 
equipment imports, actually rose at a rate after 1982 surpassing 
the preceeding ones. 
In the machinery category, the greatly expanded consumer 
spending was directed to the broad range of consumer electronics 
products such as VCRs and CD players. If automobiles were, so to 
speak, the first generation, and color television sets the second 
generation, then these products could be called the third 
generation of mass-volume consumer durables. 
Presently, while the third generation of market scale does 
not correspond as before to automobiles, it is expanding with the 
appearance of new products. As these two representative 
products, VCRs and CD players, have come to be manufactured in 
rapan, American corporations withdrew from competition after a 
time. One cannot overlook the product development and 
manufacturing capability of Japanese corporations having grown in 
their place. In these conditions, the increase in demand becomes 
directly linked simply to an increase in these imports. 
Incidentally,, the percentage of American households owning a VCR 
rose from 5.5 percent in 1983 to- 36 percent in 1986. 
A remarkable phenomenon of the 1980s' strong dollar was the 
movement of American corporations to switch from in-house 
production to out-sourcing their supplies of components and 
sometimes even finished products, particularly to overseas 
suppliers. Although a rational act to protect profits, in the 
cases where corporations in doing so reduce their manufacturing 
base, resuming production becomes difficult. It is, then, 
thought "irreversible" (see bibliography for author's earlier 
article on this subject). A considerable part of these increased 
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machinery and transportation equipment imports have become 
integrated into the production process. 
In Figure 1, despite the widening of the trade deficit and 
| deficit for industrial products therein, the manufacturing 
findustry's profits are shown to be relatively stable. A clue to 
understanding the puzzling joint existence of these two phenomena 
I lies here. 
The large-scale tax reduction under the Reagan 
f administration could not achieve its goals even in its emphasis 
on supply. Throughout the 1980s investment in plant and 
equipment has continued to decline relative to GNP. Even the 
Ismail investment boom of 1984-85, at under 4 percent, does not 
match the level at the decade's start. Generally, it is easy to 
i think that this is due to a progressive "hollowing out" of the 
domestic manufacturing base as multinational corporations move 
their production facilities overseas due to the strong dollar. 
However, investment abroad is also shrinking relative to GNP. 
There are probably cases where investment abroad has the goal of 
meeting local demand there, but in cases where it is thought to 
join with domestic industry to form a broad supply base, supply's 
atrophy should be obvious. 
Also, "irreversibility" hinders attempts to make up for this 
relative lag in investment. I will mention this later, but it is 
considerable in the machinery and transport equipment sectors, 
/ where recovery is most desirable. 
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5. IMPORTS DO NOT TURN BACK 
There is a common way of thinking that when trade imbalances 
exist, they are adjusted according to the movements of the free 
market of the exchange rate. 
However, despite the dollar's sharp fall the continuing 
trade deficit shows in the end the limits of this "pure theory." 
From this standpoint, there is a search for a more "realistic" 
*approach. One theory closely resembling "irreversibility" is 
t^hat of "hysterisin trade," advanced by such academics as MIT's 
iPaul Klugman and Columbia's Richard Baldwin. Hysteris, 
originally a physics term, means the failure of a property to 
return to its prior state of equilibrium even after the cause of 
-its change is removed. According to this line of thought, 
America's imports are a model example. Once the dollar rises and 
{imports rapidly increase, imports will not shrink even when the 
dollar returns to its prior level. Having invested considerably 
with an eye to the future in the establishment of sales networks 
and employee training during the strong-dollar period, foreign 
^companies exporting to the American market will continue selling 
% here despite worsening profits, rather than withdraw from the 
.{market because of the weak dollar. 
From this standpoint, the practice of setting export prices 
•to America is attracting a great deal of attention. Catherine 
J Mann of the World Bank is conducting a wide-ranging investigation 
import product prices. According to Mann, contrary to American 
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the question depends on each industry sector. It would be useful 
|to view various movements under the dollar's alternating motions 
to test the trade balance's prospects. In that case, it is an 
important point whether irreversible change has occurred. 
In Table 4, I roughly pulled together evidence on this 
point. Here we divide three industry sectors (cf. Figure 1, 
excluding "consumer goods") into a total of seven groups. For 
processed primary industrial products, they can be divided into 
1
 -T 
1) resource-based types and (2) all others for processed primary 
Industrial products. 
In case (1) where American corporations dominate the 
(domestic market on a basis of abundant and inexpensive natural 
resources (such as wood or agricultural products) the domstic 
market becomes a base of support even under the strong dollar, 
land production facilities are maintained. The weak dollar, 
directly restoring price competitiveness, increases exports. If 
there is insufficient capacity, plant and equipment increase. 
Even if production facilities are discontinued, there are no 
high-tech demands; restarting is simple.1 
ST 
H Compared with (1) , (2) has no competitive advantage. There 
tare many cases of import restrictions being soon enacted. The 
1
 The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem states that international 
economy benefits by each country's specializing in the export of 
goods intensively employing those factors of production possessed 
in relative abundance. The case in which America's type (1) 
industries, overcoming exchange rate pressures, have maintained 
°r increased their exports shows the validity of this 
=theorem. 
BUcport prices, import prices even under the weak dollar are not 
ising much (Figure 2). 
While "hysteris" turns our attention to the continuation of 
j^ nerica's high import levels, the trade balance recently has at 
last come to show some signs of clear improvement. Last 
November's trade deficit at $13.2 billion was much below the 
Record $17.6 billion in October, and has since continued to 
improve. Viewing exports for last year's four quarters on a 
v^olume basis (Table 3), one can interpret the export of mainly 
industrial products as having greatly increased (this is 
^particularly true for November and December). 
Among industrial products, if one were to look a little more 
closely, the growth was large for capital goods other than 
automobiles, consumer goods, and automobiles/parts. Speaking of 
automobiles, there was talk of Sweden's Volvo switching over to 
American automobile parts. There even appears be the aspect of a 
small export boom for American industry. However, in dollar 
terms, figures in Table 3 are barely moving. Since signs of 
weakness are evident in places, it is clear that the export boom 
is a direct reflection of increased price competitiveness and 
export profits due to the weak dollar. 
6. RESPONSES TO THE DOLLAR'S ALTERNATING MOTIONS 
The dollar's exchange rate in this way certainly performs a 
great task. Even so, it is also certain that there is also 
"irreversibility" or "hysteris." It can be thought that finally 
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easing of import pressures with a weak dollar alone does not lead 
to increases in plant and equipment. 
Next, we can divide machinery into cases where America is 
ahead in product development and production [(3) and (4)] and 
where Japan is ahead [(5)]. In category (3), American 
corporations maintain their produciton base. However, in (4) 
reduction of the production base or, in extreme cases, 
discontinuance has occurred. For example, in the competition 
against foreign corporations in microwave ovens, American 
corporations have for all practical purposes given up production, 
switching to import sales under OEM arrangements (original 
squipment manufacturer, where a company sells under its own brand 
ame a product manufactured by its partner). Here even with a 
eak dollar domestic production does not resume. That is, an 
irreversible change is happening.2 Especially within the 
ansport equipment sector, look at automobiles in (6). Although 
dcally an industry developed in America, its production base 
s shrinking owing to the penetration of imported automobiles.3 
ereafter, it will be difficult in reality to increase production 
pability in response to the weak dollar. 
2
 Most American companies in the semiconductor industry have 
opped producing DRAMs. Currently, only Texas Instruments is 
ally making them. However, Motorola and National Semiconductor 
ve expressed the intention of re-entering this field. If this 
•re to happen, it would show that "irreversibility" need not 
ntinue forever. 
3
 On the other hand, if local production in America by 
apanese automakers takes place in earnest, although a portion of 
iponent imports would remain, that part held by automobile 
>orts would disappear. 
If one further draws together the above evidence , the 
ollowing may be said concerning America's trade patterns: 
1) For both exports and imports, but really for the question of 
exports, the exchange rate's direct influence on industrial 
products works on processed primary industrial products and 
type (3) machinery. Adding agricultural products, the part 
of the trade figures adjustment possible by exchange rate, 
reaches 40 percent of the total exports and imports. This is 
rather low in comparison with "pure theory," which assumes 
100 percent; 
2) There is aerospace-related equipment [(7) transport 
equipment], in which American corporations have a strong 
base, and can continue exports regardless of whether the 
dollar is weak or strong. This sector accounts for about 10 
percent of exports;4 
3) There is the automobile and auto parts sectors in which 
although the weak dollar creates a favorable export 
environment, imports have become fixed during the high-dollar 
period and show signs of irreversibility. These sectors 
account for 10 percent of e xport and over 20 percent of 
imports 
4
 The base for aviation and aerospace exports (relatively 
abundant factors of production) consists of America's global 
military commitments and generous military R&D spending. Along 
with entering a period of questioning these commitments and 
reducing the military budget, these fields are no longer 
America's exclusive reserve. See bibliography for Packard's 
article concerning the development of Japan's FSX fighter plane 
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4) Within the machinery sector, for which originally there 
was no produciton in America or for which through the strong 
dollar period the production base shrank and moved overseas 
[types (4) and (5)], there is no increase in, or commencement 
of, exports. Fixed imports continue. This accounts for a 
level of 10 percent of total imports. 
Of course, the above are rough calculations. It is possible 
to have doubts concerning the details. I wonder, for example, 
whether there is not the possibility of returning the production 
base to America in the case where something was not produced in 
America but produced overseas by an American subsidiary, or 
whether it would be simple to resume production once switched 
overseas if a particular domestic production base were supported 
under such conditions as a weak dollar (it is not uncommon for 
companies such as IBM to do so). 
Such grey areas are natural. I wanted to confirm that, at 
any rate, adjustment of the trade balance depending on the 
exchange rate is not as total as "pure theory" predicts.5 
7. LOOKING TO THE "HEREAFTER" 
Hereafter, how should we consider America's trade balance? 
Basically, it has unmistakeably entered a process of deficit 
5
 The transformation of a strong dollar into a weak one 
greatly changes the composition of America's exports. I have 
already made some notes on the role played by factors of 
production other than labor and capital. However, in general can 
clear changes be seen in the direction of exports' labor or 
capital intensiveness? Whether this point is also connected to 
Leontief's paradox should also be investigated further. 
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reduction. Increased exports of processed primary products whose 
price competitiveness is improving, especially of resource-based 
products, should continue owing to the weak dollar. In Table 3, 
they are industrial materials, as well as nondurable goods, and 
light industrial products. They are not the things considered 
until now as America's representative export products. 
Against a background of increased exports, one sees that the 
manufacturing industry's recent plant utilization ratios are 
high. Those for textiles and paper/pulp are clearing past 
ceilings. Nondurable manufactures are planning this year a 13 
percent increase over last year in plant investment (according to 
a U.S. Commerce Department survey). In the strong-dollar period 
as well, these industires• production bases were of course 
maintained. They are showing expansion with the advent of the 
weak dollar. 
Machinery and transport equipment, however, pose problems 
for both exports and imports. For the present, one should be 
able to hope for the rise in exports to continue. Its force is 
not abating for exports of capital goods and automobiles/parts. 
Even after jumping at the end of last year (Table 3), exports for 
the fourth quarter of last year for the latter increased only 4 0 
percent over 1977. For the former, they declined by 20 percent. 
There is also spare plant capacity. The question there arises 
from perceived limits to production capability. 
In general, American corporations are at present cautious 
about investments to increase capacity. "The strong dollar of 
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the 1980s really hit hard" (David Hale, economist at Chicago's 
Kemper Financial Services). Its effects are now being felt. 
Imports, on the other hand, were still at a high level on a 
volume basis last year, particularly in the fourth quarter (Table 
3). There is no clear sign of a reduction. There are also many 
fixed imports. Where there is no domestic production base 
corresponding to them, America can only hope for the weak 
dollar's "theoretical" effects to compress imports. If such 
"theoretical" effects are not soon visible, complaints against 
foreign "dumping" will probably grow louder. 
In any case, as long as imports remain persistently high, 
given the limits to exports showing in places, deficit reduction, 
too, has to bump up against a wall. Basically, tax increases and 
such policies to control consumer spending to some necessary 
degree will apply the brakes to imports of nondurable or various 
other purely consumer items. However, bringing about such 
policies will be far harder to accomplish than many analysts 
imagine. As the supply side of the economy, that is to say the 
entire society, turns to de-industrialization and becomes an 
information and service economy, attempting to rebuild the 
industrical production base will be no less difficult. 
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Figure I Trade Balance, Dollar Race, Corporate Profits 
Sources: For Che dollar race, Morgan 
Guaranty Trust Co.'s "World 
Financial Market" 
For others, Commerce Department, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Mote: The dollar rate is the effective rate 
relative to 15 selected industrial 
nations (1980-32 average - 100) 
2 Price and Profit Margins for Representative 
Export and Import Items 
(1980 = 100) 
I 
I Tstl* 1 Changes m Imcort. "Mine bv Product Group (5100 miliicn) 
Table 2 Post-1983 Production and Imports 
Sources: Produced from Departments of Labor and Commerce, Federal Reserve Board materials 
Note: GDP and industrial production adjusted seasonally 
Source: Constructed -From Deot- o-f Commerce materials 
i .q~- 5 ''i'^^^lfWI^IJISp^^p 

































































































































Note: t • • • 
-—/ • • • 
favorable development in the trade balance ( increased surplus, decreased deficit, etc ) 
unfavorable development in the trade balance ( decreased surplus, increases deficit, etc ) 
neutral development in the trade balance 
